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Abstract
Understanding the distributional impacts of market-based climate policies is crucial to 
design economically efficient climate change mitigation policies that are socially accept-
able and avoid adverse impacts on the poor. Empirical studies that examine the distri-
butional impacts of carbon pricing and fossil fuel subsidy reforms in different countries 
arrive at ambiguous results. To systematically determine the sources of variation between 
these outcomes, we apply an ordered probit meta-analysis framework. Based on a compre-
hensive, systematic and transparent screening of the literature, our sample comprises 53 
empirical studies containing 183 effects in 39 countries. Results indicate a significantly 
increased likelihood of progressive distributional outcomes for studies on lower income 
countries and transport sector policies. The same applies to study designs that consider 
indirect effects, demand-side adjustments of consumers or lifetime income proxies.
Keywords Climate change mitigation · Distributional impacts · Environmental policies · 
Environmental taxes · Households · Inequality · Meta-analysis · Poverty · Redistribution
1 Introduction
It is well understood, that in order to achieve international climate targets as agreed in Paris, 
global greenhouse gas emissions need to decrease rapidly in the upcoming years (IPCC 
2014). In order to achieve this goal, market-based instruments, such as carbon taxes, cap-
and-trade systems or fossil fuel subsidy reforms, are frequently recommended by leading 
economists such as Nicolas Stern and Joseph Stiglitz (High-Level Commission on Carbon 
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Prices 2017). Economic theory highlights that these instruments are environmentally effec-
tive and economically efficient (Pigou 1920; Nordhaus 1991; Pearce 1991).1 In 2018, 51 
carbon pricing schemes, such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems were implemented 
or planned, covering 20 percent of the global greenhouse gas emissions (World Bank and 
Ecofys 2018), albeit at carbon prices well below those that are considered to be in line with 
the targets of the Paris Agreement. Numerous countries also apply taxes or levies on fos-
sil fuel use, for instance for transportation or heating. Even though these are not directly 
proportional to the carbon content, they nevertheless provide an incentive to reduce green-
house gas emissions. Commitment was made to the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies by the 
G20 in 2009 at the Pittsburgh summit (G20 Leaders Statement 2009) and several reforms 
have been enacted in recent years.2 (IEA and OECD 2017).
The distributional impacts of carbon and energy taxes however strongly influence 
the political acceptability (Baumol and Oates 1988; Baranzini et  al. 2000; Tiezzi 2005). 
Regressive distributional impacts harm vulnerable groups and decrease the likelihood of 
policies being implemented and sustained (Parry 2015). Social equity concerns can thus 
quickly dominate the public debate if energy prices increase (Shammin and Bullard 2009). 
For example, the incidence and the distributional impacts of the repealed Australian carbon 
tax were subject to public and academic debate (Rahman 2013; Sajeewani et al. 2015). The 
progressive Nigerian fuel and petrol subsidy reform in 2012 even resulted in mass protests 
and strikes which led to a partial reimplementation (Soile and Mu 2015; Lockwood 2015; 
Dorband et al. 2017).3
The literature on the distributional impacts of climate policies provides ambiguous 
results. Many studies find an overall tendency for regressive impacts (Araar et  al. 2011; 
Gonzalez 2012). Others detect mostly regressive findings for developed countries while 
developing countries show an inconsistent picture with a tendency towards proportional 
or progressive impacts (Verde and Tol 2009; Wang et  al. 2016). Nevertheless, progres-
sive impacts have also been shown for developed countries like Australia (Sajeewani et al. 
2015), Canada (Dissou and Siddiqui 2014) and Spain (Labandeira et al. 2009).
Previous literature reviews provide initial insights but do not systematically explain 
outcome heterogeneity, i.e. what drives the differences in results of studies. Wang et  al.
(2016) have conducted the most comprehensive literature review on distributional impacts 
of carbon prices so far. They consider distributional impacts across households differing 
by income, location and demographic characteristics. This broad scope provides valuable 
insights into various dimensions of distributional impacts. However, a common problem 
ailing most literature reviews is the lack of explicit or transparent selection and evaluation 
criteria for their study sets as well as rigorous methods for analysis of observed variation, 
which exposes them to the criticism of subjectivity and a lack of validity. The literature 
on meta-analysis is littered with examples that show how traditional literature reviews and 
vote-counting approaches can be misleading and inconsistent in their assessment of the 
state-of-art (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012; Ringquist 2013).
1 A global carbon tax might however be less efficient when considering a voluntary participation decision 
by the participating countries (McEvoy and McGinty 2018). Non-market-based policies might be suitable 
complements when accounting, e.g. for knowledge spillovers (Fischer and Newell 2008), technological 
learning (Kalkuhl et al. 2012) or in the presence of rent seeking (MacKenzie and Ohndorf 2012).
2 Only in the first half of 2017, energy subsidy reforms were enacted in Argentina, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Mozambique, Pakistan and Zambia (IEA 2017).
3 Public protests furthermore led to the reimplementation of subsidies in Venezuela in  1989, Yemen 
in 2005, Cameroon in 2008, Bolivia in 2010 (Clements et al. 2013).
3Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A Meta-Analysis 
1 3
We focus our analysis on distributional impacts across household income groups. This 
narrow scope allows the use of a meta-analysis to quantitatively determine the sources of 
variation in the study outcomes.4 Thus far, meta-analyses have mainly been applied in the 
fields of education and medicine, but organizations like the Campbell Collaboration or the 
Collaboration for Environmental Evidence have tried to establish rigorous quality stand-
ards and mainstream such work in the social and environmental sciences. In fact, there is 
an increasing volume of meta-analyses in social science including environmental econom-
ics (Moeltner et al. 2007; Nelson and Kennedy 2009; Tunçel and Hammitt 2014).
This study applies an ordered probit meta-analysis framework to 53 original studies cov-
ering economy-wide and transport sector climate mitigation policies, providing 183 effects 
in 39 countries. We analyze all market-based policies that affect the price of fossil fuels, 
regardless of whether these are put into place for climate change mitigation (e.g. a carbon 
tax, an explicit price on the carbon) or a different purpose, such as generating public rev-
enues (e.g. excises taxes on fuels). We also include studies that address fossil fuel subsidy 
removals, as the absence of a Pigouvian tax can also be regarded to constitute a (so-called 
’post-tax’) subsidy (Coady et al. 2017). We include moderator variables accounting for dif-
ferent policies, modeled economic effects, and countries, while controlling for a publica-
tion bias and a time trend. We find a significantly increased likelihood of progressive study 
outcomes for lower income countries and transport policies. The same applies to study 
designs considering indirect effects, demand-side adjustments of consumers, or lifetime 
income proxies. In contrast, we find that subsidy reforms are not inherently more progres-
sive than carbon pricing instruments.
We structure the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 elaborates our four key 
hypotheses with respect to theory and literature findings. Section  3 describes the data 
selection process, explains the variables and introduces the quantitative model. Section 4 
presents the main results while Sect. 5 discusses and concludes the findings.
2  Hypotheses
Based on economic theory and previous research findings, we expect that the policy type, 
the affected sectors and the modeled economic effects systematically influence the out-
comes of studies assessing distributional impacts. The following paragraphs discuss fac-
tors that might drive the results and subsequently develop hypotheses about the estimated 
impact.
First, literature reviews show mostly regressive impacts in developed countries. Devel-
oping countries, however, show an inconsistent picture with a tendency towards propor-
tional or progressive impacts (Verde and Tol 2009; Wang et al. 2016). These findings could 
be explained by low carbon intensities of the consumption baskets of poor households in 
lower income countries, resulting from a higher share of subsistence consumption, a low 
access to modern energy services, or the lack of affordability of energy. In fact, Flues and 
van Dender (2017) demonstrate a negative correlation between the energy affordability risk 
and GDP, for 20 OECD countries.
4 A meta-analysis in general is a “systematic, quantitative, replicable process of synthesizing numerous and 
sometimes conflicting results from a body of original studies” with the potential to provide scientifically 
robust results (Ringquist 2013, p. 3).
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Second, literature reviews strongly suggest progressive outcomes for reforms that 
decrease or abolish fossil fuel subsidies (Anand et al. 2013; Clements et al. 2013; Coady 
et  al. 2017) while carbon pricing policies show ambiguous impacts (Wang et  al. 2016). 
Fossil fuel subsidies have primarily been implemented in developing countries (Coady 
et al. 2017). Currently implemented fossil fuel subsidies are mostly regressive as they espe-
cially benefit well-organized interest groups while disadvantaging low-income households 
that spend relatively little on energy (Inchauste and Victor 2017). Small groups of powerful 
and highly profiting actors have a greater incentive to organize and influence a legislative 
process than a large group of individuals with low payoffs (Oye and Maxwell 1994). The 
political economy in combination with the consumption baskets of households in develop-
ing countries might thus explain the progressive literature findings for subsidy reforms.
Third, Wang et al. (2016) review a tendency towards progressive outcomes for transport 
sector policies.5 Others, however, show proportional or regressive outcomes in the United 
States (Casler and Rafiqui 1993; Chernick and Reschovsky 1997; Metcalf 1999; Chernick 
and Reschovsky 2000; Williams et al. 2015), Germany (Nikodinoska and Schröder 2016) 
and six other European countries (Sterner 2012). Sterner (2012) argues that the smaller car 
ownership rate in low-income countries makes fuel a luxury product. Santos and Catch-
esides (2005), however, also find a lower car ownership rate for low-income household in 
the United Kingdom, resulting in a reverse U-shape relationship between income and inci-
dence. The efficiency of the public transport system as well as indirect fuel expenditures on 
public transport could additionally influence the results (Datta 2010). Nevertheless, Kpo-
dar (2006) and Ziramba (2009) find no impact of indirect expenditures.
Finally, we compare the modeling of indirect effects, demand-side adjustments of con-
sumers, general equilibrium effects and studies that apply lifetime income proxies. We 
thus complement the previous discussion on policy and country impacts by considering 
different study designs and their corresponding modeled economic effects (see Sect.  3). 
Distributional analyses at least consider direct effects, i.e. the price increase of all goods 
that directly contain CO2 , such as gasoline. The following paragraphs discuss the potential 
impact of additional economic effects on the study outcomes.
Indirect distributional effects are caused by price changes of goods in the consumption 
basket due to CO2 emissions embedded to their value chain. Considering indirect effects 
might influence the distributive impact in both directions. Generally, their impact depends 
on the relative difference of CO2 intensities in the consumption baskets between low- and 
high-income households (Anand et  al. 2013). Hasset et  al. (2009) provide evidence that 
indirect effects mitigate regressivity in the United States. Other authors show that indirect 
effects increase regressivity as low-income households tend to spend large fractions of their 
incomes on energy-intensive food and public transport (Jacobsen et al. 2003; da Silva Frei-
tas et al. 2016).
Modeling demand-side adjustments of consumers could also ambiguously influence 
the study outcomes. The impact depends on differences in the demand elasticities between 
low- and high-income households. Zhang (2015) shows larger demand-side adjustments 
for richer households and argues that low-income households are required to focus on their 
basic needs and hence less responsive to price signals. On the contrary, West and Williams 
5 The IPCC distinguishes between economy-wide and sector-specific policies for climate change mitiga-
tion and explicitly discusses transport sector policies, such as fuel taxes, despite not explicitly having been 
designed for climate change purposes (Somanathan et al. 2014).
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(2004) show larger demand-side adjustments for low-income households which results in 
more progressive outcomes. Their study however only considers transport fuel taxes.
We expect more progressive outcomes for studies that capture general equilibrium 
effects. Several studies find general equilibrium effects to foster progressive outcomes 
(Rausch et  al. 2011; Dissou and Siddiqui 2014; Vandyck and Van  Regemorter 2014; 
Beck et al. 2015; Sajeewani et al. 2015; da Silva Freitas et al. 2016). Dissou and Siddiqui 
(2014) show that carbon taxes particularly affect the capital-intensive energy industry. This 
decreases the capital income of rich households and thus makes the distributive effect more 
progressive. Fullerton and Heutel (2011), however, highlight the results’ sensitivity on 
parameter values.
Using lifetime income proxies, rather than annual household incomes, is hypothesized 
to increase progressivity. Several literature findings based on lifetime incomes show more 
progressive outcomes for excise and transport taxes (Poterba 1989, 1991; Bull et al. 1994; 
Lyon and Schwab 1995; Hassett et al. 2009). The permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 
1957) assumes that households smooth their consumption over their lifetime. Accordingly, 
lifetime income proxies consider that low annual incomes in isolated years do not neces-
sarily correspond to low welfare as, for instance, elderly people and students tend to live on 
savings or loans. The magnitude of the effect (Fullerton and Rogers 1993), as well as the 
most suitable lifetime income proxy (Metcalf 1999; Chernick and Reschovsky 2000), are 
widely debated.
Based on this discussion, we hypothesize an increasing share of progressive study out-
comes for first, low-income countries, second, subsidy reforms and third, transport sector 
policies. We also expect more progressive findings for studies that model general equilib-
rium effects or use lifetime income proxies. Studies that consider indirect and demand-side 
effects could either provide more progressive or more regressive findings.
3  Methodology
This section first explains how studies included in the meta-analysis were selected. It then 
provides an overview of the sample, including the dependent variables from the literature 
and explanatory variables that were either derived from the studies themselves, or drawn 
from external sources. It finally describes the empirical strategy to assess determinants of 
distributional outcomes.
3.1  Data Selection
We follow Ringquist (2013) for the structure of the data selection process. This process 
comprises identifying relevant study authors and keywords, developing a search strategy, 
considering additional citations and defining study selection criteria, which allow to iden-
tify and classify studies as potentially relevant, relevant and finally, as acceptable. For lit-
erature identification we conduct a query search in the Web of Science and the Scopus liter-
ature databases. We connect three groups of keywords with boolean operators filtering for 
research on CO2 related (carbon, CO2 , gasoline, emission, environment, ecologic, energy) 
pricing policies (tax, allowance, subsidy, policy, price) investigating the distributional 
impacts (distribution, regressive, progressive, incidence, inequality, household income). 
We exclude findings from unrelated research fields by permitting characteristic keywords 
(see “Appendix  Search Query” for details). The literature search identified 1023 studies 
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restricted to literature written in English. In the first step, we exclude 856 studies with titles 
indicating irrelevant research questions, leaving 167 potentially relevant studies.
For the next steps of the selection process we apply the following study selection crite-
ria. First, we exclude 61 studies because of differing research questions, replicating find-
ings of previous studies including double hits, unavailability or insufficient quality. Second, 
we only select quantitative studies, thus excluding 34 studies that provide qualitative results 
or apply theoretical models. Third, we exclude 46 studies with an incomparable scope, i.e. 
studies pricing multiple pollutants beyond CO2 , imposing sectoral restrictions apart from 
transport, only including effects with revenue recycling schemes or only concentrating on 
urban or rural households. Last, we only select countries or large regions, thus excluding 8 
studies for single cities and supranational unions.
We employ these selection criteria successively to the abstract and the full text of the 
167 (potentially) relevant studies, resulting in 36 acceptable studies. In order to supplement 
our sample by grey literature and literature from other databases, we subsequently screen 
the references of all acceptable studies from the query search to identify further relevant 
studies. Based on this reference search, we identify another 35 relevant studies, resulting 
in another 17 acceptable studies. The final sample comprises 53 original studies with 183 
effects. Figure 1 provides an overview of the selection process. Further details are docu-
mented in the codebook, which is available upon request.
3.2  Sample Overview
The final sample comprises 53 studies with 183 effects in total. The original study author 
names, the publication years, the number of included effects per study and the percent-
age share of included effects per study relative to the 183 total effects are listed in the 
Fig. 1  Study selection process. Notes The figure shows the number of retained and excluded studies during 
the study selection process. It differs between study origin (query search and references) and study evalua-
tion step (identified, potentially relevant, relevant and accepted)
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“Appendix  Study Overview”. All studies were published between 1991 and 2017 with 
an average publication year of 2007.6 Most original studies report several effects which 
account for alternative policies, different model setups or multiple countries. The number 
of effects per study are thus unequally balanced with Flues and Thomas (2015) providing 
22.4% of the sample, Sterner (2012) 14.2% and Hasset et. al (2009) 6.6%, while the other 
studies contribute less than 5%. The 53 studies include 46 peer-reviewed journal articles 
(126 effects) and 7 articles from grey literature (57 effects).
Figure 2 shows the number of effects and the percentage share of the total sample for 
each country included. The effects per country are also unequally balanced, with the United 
States 30.6%, the United Kingdom 6.6% and Germany 4.9% contributing the largest shares 
in the sample. Grouping the effects by World Bank country income levels provides 144 
effects for high-income countries and 39 effects for low, lower-middle and upper-middle 
income countries.
3.3  Dependent Variable
The ordered categorical variable Distributional impact captures the progressive, propor-
tional or regressive distributive impact of each effect included. We only aim to explain 
whether a policy is progressive, regressive or proportional, without addressing the size of 
Fig. 2  Country sample overview. Notes The figure shows the number of effects (left y-axis) and their share 
in the sample in percent (right y-axis) per country (x-axis)
6 The list of potentially relevant studies included publications starting from 1976. However, no study before 
1991 matched our selection criteria.
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this effect, as the inequality measures applied in the original studies are not quantitatively 
comparable. The methods suggested by the meta-analysis literature to harmonize differ-
ent effect size metrics are not applicable to this study.7 We also tried to subsample studies 
with identical inequality metrics, but unfortunately the sample sizes became too small to 
conduct a quantitative analysis. Section 5 discusses the implications of abstracting from the 
effect size. Neglecting the effect size increases the significance and validity of the results 
as it allows us to examine a larger sample of original studies. The coding decision either 
directly relies on quantitative inequality measures or on the interpretation of the original 
study author’s. The 183 effects comprise 52 progressive, 13 proportional and 118 regres-
sive outcomes (see Table 1).
3.4  Moderator Variables
Moderator variables are hypothesized to systematically influence the outcomes of the 
original studies (Ringquist 2013). We include moderator variables that allow us to test the 
hypotheses developed in Sect. 2. The policy and the country moderator variables account 
for differences in the presumed distributional impact, while the economic effect variables 
implicitly capture different study designs. We also control for a potential publication bias 
and a time trend. Table 1 summarizes the variables included. We exclude effects that model 
revenue recycling schemes as those are either too context-specific for designing reasonable 
moderator variables or, in case of lump-sum, completely offset prior regressive findings, 
which leads to a perfect predictor. This particularly applies to effects in studies using com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models, which our analysis only considers if results are 
explicitly reported without the impact of revenue recycling schemes.
Furthermore, we test the bivariate relationship between the moderator variables and the 
dependent variable. For the binary moderator variables we conduct a two-proportion z-test. 
Similarly, we conduct a correlation analysis for the continuous moderator variables. The 
results of the two tests indicate an overall suitable selection of moderator variables. Fur-
ther analysis, however, requires a multiple regression analysis as the bivariate tests ignore 
potential correlations between the moderator variables. The remainder of this section 
briefly explains the moderator variables included. More details about individual moderator 
variables and the bivariate analyses, including their results tables, are provided in “Appen-
dix Detailed Moderator Variable Description”.
Policy Variables We include two variables controlling for policy differences: The Sub-
sidy variable differs between subsidy reforms and carbon pricing schemes. The Transport 
variable compares policies only on the transport sector with economy-wide policies. Gen-
erally, we only include effects increasing the burden for households, i.e. resulting from 
increasing or introducing energy or carbon prices as well as decreasing or removing exist-
ing subsidies.
Economic Effect Variables We include four moderator variables which account for dif-
ferent economic effects: Indirect, Demand-side, General equilibrium and Lifetime income. 
The first three variables correspond to the model types used in the original studies while 
lifetime income proxies reflect differences in the underlying data. We explicitly include 
7 Quantitatively comparing the change of a country’s Gini coefficient with a graphical representation of the 
relative tax burden for each income decile is not feasible. For more details on effect size harmonization see 
Ringquist (2013) chapter three “Calculating and Combining Effect Sizes”.
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moderator variables on the modeled economic effects and not on the model type. This 
method allows us to extract more information from the original studies. Many authors, for 
example, using Input-Output models separately report both the direct and the indirect dis-
tributive impact. We however disregard information on the impact of the different model 
types themselves.
Each model type at least considers direct effects. We identify and include three major 
groups of more advanced models in the literature: Input-Output models, micro-simulation 
models and CGE models.8 The Indirect variable covers the joint impact of direct and indi-
rect effects and comprises findings from Input-Output and CGE models. The Demand-side 
variable covers demand-side changes of different income groups which are considered by 
micro-simulations and CGE models. The General equilibrium variable covers the long-
term general equilibrium effects and thus the income source side which are only analyzed 
by CGE models. The Lifetime income effects variable accounts for effects considering life-
time income proxies as opposed to annual household incomes.
Context Variables The Publication type variable differs between peer-reviewed jour-
nal articles and grey literature. The Publication year variable accounts for a potential time 
trend of study outcomes.
Country Variables We address the panel structure of our dataset by including time-
fixed country dummies and time-variant variables. Our main specification includes 38 
(N − 1,N = 39) single country dummies that account for unobservable time-fixed country 
effects. It also includes three time-variant country variables: the GDP per capita, the Gini 
and the Poverty gap variable (see “Appendix Detailed Moderator Variable Description” for 
more details). These variables control for the country income and its distribution. For addi-
tional robustness checks, we group the countries based on the World Bank country income 
level classifications, namely high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low-income countries. 
The country data originates from the World Bank dataset between the years 1990 and 
2014.9 (World Bank 2017).
3.5  Ordered Probit Model
The bivariate analyses indicate a significant impact of most moderator variables on the 
dependent variable (see “Appendix Detailed Moderator Variable Description”). Identifying 
the isolated influence of each moderator variable, however, requires a regression analysis. 
The ordered categorical dependent variable with the outcomes progressive, proportional 
and regressive suggests the application of an ordered probit model. The approach is based 
on Greene (2012) and methodologically similar to the meta-analyses of Waldorf and Byun 
(2005), Card et al. (2009) and Wehkamp et al. (2018).
This ordered probit model uses a continuous latent variable y∗ to measure the unob-
served effect size of each original study. We assume y∗ to be correlated with the three 
observed distributional effects: progressive ( y = 0 ), proportional ( y = 1 ) and regressive 
( y = 2 ). Suppressing the observation-specific index, the relationship between y∗ and the 
moderator variables X is assumed to follow a linear regression model of the form
9 We adjust the data as further described in “Appendix Detailed Moderator Variable Description”.
8 Wang et. al. (2016) further list econometric models as a group. Due to their specific design and their 
rare occurrence we omit them from this analysis. Further details on the three model types are described in 
“Appendix Original Study Model Details”.
11Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A Meta-Analysis 
1 3
with y∗ potentially varying between −∞ and ∞ and  being a normally distributed error 
term. The observed distributional impact y is linked to the underlying latent variable y∗ by
where 1 is an unknown threshold parameter simultaneously estimated with .
The probability of estimating a progressive ( y = 0 ), proportional ( y = 1 ) or regres-
sive ( y = 2 ) distributional effect is given by
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We estimate the 
parameters by the maximum likelihood method with the previously described probabili-
ties entering the likelihood function. The beta coefficients in combination with the p-value 
provide the direction and the significance of the effect; a positive  coefficient suggests 
that the respective moderator variable X increases the probability of obtaining a regressive 
outcome ( P(y = 2) ). Vice versa, a negative  coefficient suggests that the respective mod-
erator variable X increases the probability of finding a progressive outcome ( P(y = 0) ). The 
coefficients have an ambiguous effect on the probability of finding a proportional outcome 
( P(y = 1) ). The marginal effects at means show the magnitude of the probability change for 
the three possible outcomes induced by the moderator variables. The pseudo-R2 is reported 
as a measure of fit (McFadden 1974).
We conduct several sensitivity analyses and specification tests as proposed by the 
best-practice guideline for future meta-analysis by Nelson and Kennedy (2009). First, 
we impose cluster-robust standard errors by country to address non-independence of 
observations. Second, our dataset contains only a few observations and thus a low time 
variation for several countries which imposes the risk of multicollinear time-fixed and 
time-variant variables. We thus alter our model by assuming fixed-effects for country 
income groups instead for single countries and also by omitting country fixed-effects 
to investigate their overall impact. Furthermore, we test several combinations of the 
time-variant country variables. Third, we test the validity of the ordered probit model 
specification by conducting significantly progressive and regressive probit regressions. 
Fourth, we use a jackknife method to identify the impact of single countries on the 
results (Gould 1995). Fifth, we present our findings for carbon pricing policies only, 
i.e. under exclusion of effects for subsidy reforms. Sixth, we test whether simulated 
policies provide systematically different results than actually implemented policies. 
Finally, we test for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factors and the joint 
significance of the variable groups using the likelihood-ratio test. “Appendix Robust-
ness Checks” provides more details about the sensitivity analyses and specification 
tests, “Appendix  Regression Results Overview” contains the regression coefficients 
without subsidy reforms.
(1)y∗ = X + 
(2)
y = 0 if y∗ < 0
y = 1 if 0 < y∗ < 𝜇1
y = 2 if 𝜇1 < y
∗
(3)
P(y = 0|X) = Φ(−X)
P(y = 1|X) = Φ(1 − X) − Φ(−X)
P(y = 2|X) = 1 − Φ(1 − X)
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Table 2  Ordered probit results
The table shows the baseline specification regression coefficients and the marginal effects at means for the 
three different dependent variable outcomes. The marginal effects at means indicate the changed likelihood 
in percentage points to obtain the three possible dependent variable outcomes
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Distributional impact: 0 = progressive, 1 = proportional, 2 = regressive
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Moderator variable Coefficient Marginal effect
Regressive Proportional Progressive
Policy variables
 Subsidy 0.211 0.084 − 0.012 − 0.072
(1.671) (0.665) (0.095) (0.570)
 Transport − 1.405** − 0.559** 0.081 0.477***
(0.632) (0.248) (0.077) (0.182)
Economic effect variables
 Indirect − 0.628** − 0.250** 0.036 0.214**
(0.257) (0.102) (0.026) (0.088)
 Demand-side − 0.778* − 0.309* 0.045 0.264*
(0.464) (0.185) (0.038) (0.159)
 General equilibrium 0.028 0.011 − 0.002 − 0.010
(0.873) (0.347) (0.050) (0.297)
 Lifetime income − 1.254* − 0.499* 0.073 0.426**
(0.693) (0.275) (0.073) (0.211)
Context variables
 Publication type − 0.558 − 0.222 0.032 0.189
(0.650) (0.259) (0.044) (0.219)
 Publication year 0.069 0.027 − 0.004 − 0.023
(0.067) (0.026) (0.005) (0.021)
Country variables
 GDP per capita − 0.107 − 0.042 0.006 0.036
(0.095) (0.038) (0.008) (0.030)
 Gini − 0.198 − 0.079 0.011 0.067
(0.244) (0.097) (0.017) (0.081)
 Poverty gap − 0.879*** − 0.349*** 0.051* 0.299***
(0.272) (0.110) (0.029) (0.105)
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4  Results
Table  2 shows the regression results of our main ordered probit model specification 
which includes the single country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by 
countries. The first column provides the estimated coefficients, the subsequent three 
columns present the marginal effects at mean for the three possible original study out-
comes. A negative coefficient indicates an increased probability of a progressive study 
outcome, but conveys no information on the magnitude of this increased probability. 
Hence, we include marginal effects at mean. For binary variables they indicate by how 
many percentage points the likelihood of an outcome differs when the binary variable is 
































Fig. 3  Results overview. Notes The figure plots the coefficients and confidence intervals (90 and 95%) for 
the three main model specifications with “Single Country Dummies”, “Group Country Dummies” and “No 
Country Dummies”, either including the three time-variant country variables (“Baseline”) or excluding 
them (“No Country Variables”)
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percentage points the likelihood of an outcome changes by a change of one unit, taking 
the mean variable value as the starting point.
Figure  3 additionally plots the coefficients for the most relevant alternative model 
specifications, i.e. regressions with single country dummies, group country dummies 
and no country dummies. For all three regression types we show the results with and 
without the three time-variant country variables (“Baseline” and “No Country Varia-
bles”). General findings from all robustness checks are discussed in Sect. 4.5. For a bet-
ter overview we report the 38 coefficients of the single country dummies separately in 
the “Appendix Country Dummy Coefficients”.
The results confirm our hypotheses of a significantly increased likelihood for pro-
gressive study outcomes of transport policies, within lower income countries and for 
studies applying lifetime income proxies. In contrast, we show that studies on sub-
sidy reforms are not inherently more progressive than carbon pricing instruments. The 
regression results show no impact of studies considering general equilibrium effects, 
while modeling indirect effects and demand-side adjustments of consumers provide 
more progressive study outcomes. The next subsections discuss the results for the differ-
ent variable groups in detail.
4.1  Policy Variables
We hypothesize that the two policy variables Subsidy and Transport will foster progres-
sive outcomes; the Transport coefficient indeed indicates a significantly higher likeli-
hood of progressive outcomes while the Subsidy coefficient is insignificant. Both find-
ings are highly robust among most other model specifications (see Fig. 3).
The insignificant finding for the Subsidy coefficient sharply contrasts with other lit-
erature findings but supports standard economic theory; as subsidies are equal to nega-
tive taxes (Varian 2009), the impact of removing subsidies should not be systematically 
different to that of taxes or cap-and-trade systems, after controlling for all other influ-
ences. The finding is robust over all other specifications besides one notable exception; 
the regression with no country dummies and no country variables shows a highly sig-
nificant negative coefficient, indicating more progressive results for subsidies as previ-
ously expected. Again, energy subsidies have primarily been implemented in developing 
countries (Coady et al. 2017). Accordingly, our sample only includes subsidy policies in 
non high-income countries, such as India, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland and Turkey. We 
thus reason that the country variables capture the progressive impact of subsidy reforms.
The Transport coefficient indicates a significantly and highly increased likelihood of 
progressive outcomes, as hypothesized. The marginal effects at mean show an increased 
likelihood of progressive outcomes of 44.7%, and a 55.9% decreased likelihood of 
regressive outcomes, at the 1% and 5% significance levels (see Table 2). Hence, a pro-
gressive impact of a policy in the transport sector is 55.9 percentage points more likely 
than an economy-wide policy. Transport sector policies thus largely contribute to the 
overall share of progressive findings in our sample. Most robustness checks confirm 
this finding though the magnitude of the effect decreases for regressions without single 
country dummies. Again, one notable exception is the regression with no country dum-
mies and variables which shows an insignificant coefficient. This finding corresponds 
with the ambiguous literature outcomes which mostly show progressive but also regres-
sive impacts in primarily high-income countries.
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4.2  Economic Effect Variables
We hypothesize a progressive impact of the Lifetime income and the General equilibrium 
variables while being inconclusive about the Indirect and the Demand-side variables. 
Table 2 confirms that the application of Lifetime income proxies increases the likelihood of 
progressive findings. Progressive findings are also more likely in studies including Indirect 
and Demand-side effects. The General equilibrium coefficient is insignificant and hence 
does not support our hypothesis.
The marginal effects at means for the Lifetime income variable indicate an increasing 
likelihood of progressive outcomes by 42.6%. Regressive outcomes are 49.9% less likely. 
The results confirm the theory and are supported by the robustness checks. The magnitude 
of the coefficient, however, decreases for all regressions without single country dummies, 
though the significance level increases from 10% to 5%.
The marginal effects for the Indirect variable indicate an increasing likelihood for pro-
gressive outcomes by 21.4%. Regressive outcomes are 25% less likely at the 5% signifi-
cance level. Other model specifications consistently show coefficients of slightly smaller 
magnitudes at mostly the same significance level. Previous literature findings show both 
increasing and decreasing regressivity of indirect effects (see Sect. 2). The results suggest 
more CO2-intensive consumption baskets of richer households.
The Demand-side variable increases the likelihood of progressive outcomes by 26.4% 
while regressive outcomes are 30.9% less likely. Robustness checks including single 
dummy variables show mostly significant coefficients at the 5 or 10% level except when 
standard errors are clustered by studies. Without the single country dummies the coeffi-
cients become insignificant. The progressive effect of the Demand-side variable is thus 
sensitive to the modeling of unobserved country characteristics. Though our findings sug-
gest larger elasticities for low-income households, additional and country-specific research 
is recommended.
The General equilibrium coefficient remains insignificant over most model specifications. 
This finding strictly contradicts our hypothesis. One explanation would be the small num-
ber of general equilibrium effects included, in combination with our categorical dependent 
variable; CGE models are the only model type capturing general equilibrium effects. Many 
CGE models in the literature, however, include revenue recycling schemes which we exclude 
from this analysis. Our sample thus only contains 12 effects from CGE models of which 50% 
show regressive outcomes (see “Appendix Detailed Moderator Variable Description”). The 
ordered categorical dependent variable only considers the overall outcome, i.e. regressive, 
proportional or progressive. We thus do not account for changes within each category, e.g. 
from strongly to weakly regressive. Therefore, we do not account for the presumably progres-
sive source side effects within those six overall regressive outcomes. We further elaborate the 
implications of using a categorical dependent variable in Sect. 5.
Summing up, including a wider range of economic effects mostly fosters more progres-
sive outcomes. The economic effects either reflect the application of more sophisticated 
model types or a different data base using lifetime income proxies.
4.3  Context Variables
Table 2 neither shows a publication bias, nor a time trend. The Publication Type coeffi-
cients remain insignificant over model specifications including single country dummies. 
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The robustness checks without single country dummies, however, indicate a publication 
bias towards more progressive outcomes. The Publication Year coefficients are insig-
nificant over most model specifications though there are two significant coefficients with 
opposite signs. The two-proportion z-test results suggest a progressive publication bias and 
a time trend towards more progressive outcomes (see “Appendix Detailed Moderator Vari-
able Description”). In fact, the grey literature included primarily investigates developing 
countries. Furthermore, research on developing countries has been increasing over recent 
years. The findings suggest that the country variables, and especially the single country 
dummies, account for both trends.
4.4  Country Variables
The regression results support our hypothesis of more progressive study outcomes for 
countries with lower income levels. Our main regression includes 38 single country dum-
mies and three country variables accounting for time-fixed and time-variant country char-
acteristics, respectively. The interpretation of the results of this variable group requires a 
particularly detailed investigation of the regression outputs.
Table  2 shows a significantly negative coefficient for the Poverty gap variable as 
expected. The finding indicates a higher likelihood of progressive outcomes for very poor 
or unequal countries. The coefficient, however, becomes small or insignificant for regres-
sions without single country dummies. The finding is further sensitive to the countries 
included (see Sect. 4.5). The Gini coefficient is insignificant for all regressions. The GDP 
per capita coefficients are mostly insignificant in regressions with single country dummies 
which contradicts our hypothesis (see “Appendix Regression Results Overview”).
An increased likelihood of progressive impacts in lower income countries is, however, 
clearly indicated by additional model specifications. The insignificant GDP per capita 
coefficients can be explained by the small temporal variation of the country variables, as 
the sample includes only a few observations for particularly low-income countries. The 
reduced temporal variation evokes multicollinear time-variant country variables and time-
fixed single country dummies. The coefficients for the single country dummies and the 
country variables are thus inefficient for the main model specification. We address this 
problem by estimating another model that replaces the country group dummies with the 
single country dummies and another version which excludes the time-variant country vari-
ables. All model specifications without single country dummies, i.e. with country group 
dummies or without any country dummies, show significantly positive GDP per capita 
coefficients which implies more regressive study outcomes for richer countries. The regres-
sion coefficients for our specification with country group dummies but without country 
variables confirm this finding; the three group dummies coefficients (upper-middle, lower-
middle and low) are significantly negative and increase in magnitude for decreasing income 
levels of the country groups.
4.5  Robustness Checks
We conduct several additional analyses to validate our findings.
First, we address non-independence of observations by imposing cluster-robust standard 
errors by country for every regression. Additionally we test the sensitivity of the stand-
ard errors to the clustering decision by imposing cluster-robust standard errors by study. 
Results are reported in “Appendix  Regression Results Overview”. Clustering by study 
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shows broadly similar significance levels for most coefficients. Notable exceptions are the 
insignificant coefficient for the Demand-side variable and the significant coefficients for the 
Publication Year and the GPD per capita variables. We conclude that the clustering deci-
sion has a slight influence on the results. The overall findings, however, remain unchanged.
Second, we test the influence of single countries on the results by conducting jackknife 
regressions (Gould 1995). The jackknife method performs N regressions by leaving out 
the jth observations where j = 1, 2, ..., N is the number of each country (N = 39). “Appen-
dix  Jackknife Findings” shows the distribution of the N jackknife coefficients for each 
moderator variable including fitted normal distributions. The coefficients outside the 99% 
confidence interval unsurprisingly mostly correspond to countries with large numbers of 
effects, i.e. the United States and the United Kingdom. Most coefficients, however, remain 
similar in sign or overall magnitude besides the Subsidy and the Poverty gap coefficients. 
Omitting Brazil or Poland strongly influences these two coefficients as the sample contains 
just a few effects from lower income countries while both variables only have few posi-
tive observations. These two outlier countries have no impact on jackknife regressions for 
model specifications without single country dummies.10
Third, we analyze how excluding subsidy reforms affects our findings. “Appendix 
Regression Results Overview” shows, that most of our coefficients remain largely similar. 
Findings of regressions including subsidy reforms are thus confirmed and hence also valid 
for carbon pricing policies only.
Fourth, we test whether policy simulations provide different results than actually imple-
mented policies. We find no impact for most model specifications. Yet, selected specifi-
cations show a higher likelihood of regressive study outcomes for simulations, while the 
Transport coefficient turns insignificant. Both, the simulation and transport variable, are 
strongly correlated (−  0.78), as most studies only simulate economy-wide carbon price, 
whereas gasoline taxes are actually implemented.11
Finally, we investigate the validity of our ordered probit model specification by con-
ducting probit regressions on significantly regressive and progressive outcomes, reported 
in “Appendix Regression Results Overview”. The coefficients of the significantly regres-
sive probit regression are close to the ordered probit model coefficients. The significantly 
progressive probit coefficients are mostly opposite in sign. The findings indicate a valid 
ordered probit model specification.
5  Discussion and Conclusion
Market-based climate mitigation policies often raise concerns about potentially adverse 
distributional impacts. Emission reductions at the expense of the poorest would aggra-
vate poverty and undo progress for human development. Such inequitable outcomes could 
also severely undermine the political feasibility of market-based mitigation policies. 
10 In addition, we test whether the three studies with the highest number of observations influence our find-
ings by manually removing each study and subsequently conducting the six main regressions. The Lifetime 
income variable becomes insignificant when removing the Flues and Thomas (2015) study, which can be 
attributed to the fact that the study indeed provides a large number of effects that distinguish between dis-
tributional impacts with, and without considering lifetime incomes. This highly cited study has been pub-
lished by OECD Publishing and has thus not undergone an academic, but an OECD internal peer-review 
processes, which comprises double checks by other departments and by member country delegates.
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to test this interesting potential impact on the results.
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Understanding the distributional implications of climate policy is hence crucial for the 
design of just and effective climate policies.
This study carries out a meta-analysis of the existing literature to systematically explain 
differences in distributional outcomes of carbon pricing. We employ an ordered probit 
analysis on 53 original studies and analyze how country-specific factors, the type of policy 
under study as well as the modeling approach affect the likelihood of regressive or progres-
sive outcomes.
We find a significantly increased likelihood of progressive study outcomes within lower 
income countries and for transport policies. The same applies to study designs consider-
ing indirect effects, demand-side adjustments of consumers or lifetime income proxies. 
In contrast, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that subsidy reforms are inher-
ently more progressive than carbon pricing. These insights bear direct relevance for policy 
makers in the initial stages of policy design for the decision which possible policy options 
should be explored in more detail. Nevertheless, policies that are implemented should be 
subject to detailed analysis that takes the country-specific context into account instead of 
relying on general patterns that hold across countries.
The interpretation of the results should particularly consider the following limitations 
of the analysis. Disregarding the effect size of overall regressive, proportional or progres-
sive distributional impacts influences the regression coefficients. Our methodology does 
not account for differences within outcome categories, for example between strongly and 
weakly regressive effects. Smaller changes in the distributional impact within single stud-
ies, which are mostly driven by the economic effect variables, are thus ignored. This results 
in downward biased and less significant coefficients, as illustrated by the General equilib-
rium coefficient. Likewise, treating similar distributional impacts between studies equally, 
irrespective of their magnitudes, might ambiguously influence the size and significance of 
the coefficients. Estimating the effect size using subsamples with common and thus quan-
titatively comparable inequality metrics, however, suffers from too few observations to be 
representative.
Finally, the small number of effects for lower income countries decreases the accuracy 
of our findings. Our analysis shows a large impact of two lower income countries on two 
variables (see Sect. 4.5). A higher proportion of effects on lower income countries in com-
bination with a larger total sample would reduce the impact of outliers, allow for more 
refined moderator variables, and thus provide more precise insights. We thus recommend 
future researchers to put an emphasis on distributional impacts in lower income countries. 
The robustness checks, however, confirm the overall validity of our findings.
It should be noted that even progressive policies increase consumer prices, which raises 
the risk of poverty for low-income households. In the most extreme cases this may lead to 
public resistance as illustrated by the example of Nigeria in 2012. The risk of poverty can, 
however, be offset by suitable revenue recycling schemes that compensate poor households 
(van Heerden et al. 2006). Revenue recycling can also provide various other benefits. For 
example, using revenues to reduce distorting income taxes can potentially lead to more 
employment, higher individual welfare and higher GDP growth (Pearce 1991; Goulder 
1995; Pezzey and Park 1998). Revenues can also be used for public investments in infra-
structure, providing access to water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications and trans-
port (Jakob et al. 2016). Climate policies in combination with a targeted use of revenues 
thus have the potential to simultaneously mitigate climate change and address additional 
sustainable development goals. However, public debates frequently focus on the distribu-
tional impact of consumer expenditures and thus underestimate or ignore the usually pro-
gressive impact of revenue recycling schemes, even if simultaneously proposed. Our results 
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could therefore be interpreted as a proxy for publicly perceived distributional impacts of 
climate mitigation policies, though being economically incomplete. Distributional impacts 
of different revenue recycling schemes are thus an interesting research avenue for further 
research, but beyond the scope of this paper due to unresolvable methodological challenges 
(see Sect. 3.4).
This study contributes to an increased understanding of the distributional impacts or the 
potential benefits of climate mitigation policies, which may further support their imple-
mentation. Thus far, there has been a widespread belief that consumption taxes, and par-
ticularly environmental taxes, would particularly impose a burden on the poor. However, 
more than one third of the effects included in this sample are progressive or proportional. 
Hence, distributional outcomes of market-based climate policies depend on a variety of 
(often country-specific) factors. This kind of research may thus help prevent actors with 
vested interests, such as investors fearing stranded assets or workers fearing job losses 
(Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017), from instigating a public opposition against unwanted 
policies.
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Appendix for Online Publication
Search Query
We use different combinations of keywords to comprehensively identify a broad set of 
original studies for our analysis. Unsuitable categories (for Scopus) and keywords indicat-
ing unsuitable categories (for both literature databases) are directly excluded. Adapting the 
two search queries to the respective syntaxes gives:
Web of Science
TS = (((carbon OR CO2 OR fuel OR gasoline OR emission* OR environment* OR eco-
logic* OR energy) NEAR/3 (“tax“ OR “taxes“ OR “taxation“ OR allowance* OR subsid* 
OR polic* OR pric*)) NEAR/10 (distribut* OR regressive OR progressive OR incidence 
OR inequality OR (household* NEAR/1 income*))) NOT TS = (“smart grid“ OR biomass 
OR (distribut* NEAR/1 (energ* OR network* OR spatial)) OR “power plant“ OR “natural 
gas“ OR health OR solar OR hydropower OR software OR wireless OR “computer“ OR 
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forest) NOT WC = (“engineering electrical electronic“ OR “thermodynamics“ OR zool-
ogy OR oceanography OR “engineering civil“ OR “computer science theory methods“)
Scopus
TITLE-ABS-KEY(((carbon OR CO2 OR fuel OR gasoline OR emission* OR environ-
ment* OR ecologic* OR energy) W/3 ((“tax“ OR “taxes“ OR “taxation“ OR allowance* 
OR subsid* OR polic* OR pric*)) W/10 (distribut* OR regressive OR progressive OR 
incidence OR inequality OR “household income“))) AND NOT TITLE-ABS-KEY(“smart 
grid“ OR biomass OR (distribut* W/1(energ* OR network* OR spatial)) OR “power 
plant“ OR “natural gas“ OR health OR solar OR hydropower OR software OR wireless 
OR “computer“ OR forest) AND (EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA,“COMP“) OR EXCLUDE 
(SUBJAREA,“MATH“) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA,“CENG“))
Study Overview
See Table 3.
Detailed Moderator Variable Description
Policy Variables The Subsidy variable includes all effects of studies modeling subsidy 
reforms. For this variable we allow for policies on single fuels, while carbon taxes and cap-
and-trade systems only consider economy-wide policies. The variable implicitly abstracts 
from differences between carbon tax policies and cap-and-trade systems and specific policy 
designs though both have been widely debated in the literature (Parry et al. 1999; Parry 
2004; Leach 2009; Dissou and Karnizova 2016; Shinkuma and Sugeta 2016). The Trans-
port variable includes all effects of studies on the transport sector alone. This includes 
higher prices for petrol, diesel or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) explicitly used for trans-
port purposes. To ensure comparability with other policies, we only include distributional 
impacts on all households, irrespective if they own a car or not.
Country Variables and Data We measure the GDP per capita variable in steps of 1000 
US$ in constant 2010 US$. The Gini coefficient, as commonly applied to measure the 
distribution of income and wealth, takes values between 0 and 1 if the measure is non-
negative. A higher Gini coefficient indicates a larger inequality. The Poverty gap variable 
measures the mean shortfall from the poverty line of 3.10 US$ of 2011 PPP. It therefore 
simultaneously captures the amount of people below the poverty line as well as their dis-
tance to it. A value of 0 indicates that no household can be found below the poverty line. 
The higher the value the larger the number or depth of households in poverty. Further 
information on the poverty line methodology can be found at: http://irese arch.world bank.
org/Povca lNet/metho dolog y.aspx.
The four country dummies by income level refer to the GNI per capita in US$ using 
the Atlas methodology. We use data from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
for the years 1990-2014 (World Bank 2017). Further information on the dataset can be 
obtained from: https ://data.world bank.org/data-catal og/world -devel opmen t-indic ators .
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We adjust our coded data or the dataset to consistently match the World Bank data for 
the countries included. First, we match the country data with the publication year of the 
original study’s underlying household survey data, unless the authors provide an explicit 
reference year. As our dataset only contains data from 1990–2014, we truncate the ref-
erence year/household data publication year accordingly. Second, the dataset lacks time-
consistent data on the gini coefficients and the poverty gap. We fill the gaps with the next 
available datapoint in the future. If there is no available datapoint, we use the last available 
datapoint. Third, as there is no available data for British Columbia and Taiwan we use data 
for Canada and China, respectively. Further information on the coding and the data are 
documented in the codebook which is available upon request.
Bivariate z-test We test the bivariate relationship between the moderator variables and 
the dependent variable. For the binary moderator variables we conduct a two-proportion 
z-test. The test results indicate, if using the variable significantly changes the proportion of 
progressive, proportional or regressive study outcomes. Similarly we conduct a correlation 
analysis for the continuous moderator variables. The results indicate sign and significance 
of the correlation between the moderator variables and the dependent variable. Table  4 
shows the results for both tests.
The two-proportion z-test results indicate a significant impact of more than half of the 
binary moderator variables on the proportion of study outcomes. For instance, the share of 
progressive findings for studies modeling transport policies increases to 36.2% compared 
to 20.2% for studies on economy-wide policies. The correlation analysis shows a signifi-
cant correlation between most continuous variables and the dependent variable. The results 
of the two tests indicate a reasonable selection of moderator variables. The bivariate tests 
however ignore potential correlations between the moderator variables.
Additional Moderator Variables We exclude several potentially interesting modera-
tor variables on policies and the study design. In particular, we neglect policy variables 
on revenue recycling schemes, levels of pricing and the impact of single fuels. The mod-
eled revenue recycling schemes in the literature are too context-specific to be aggregated 
to homogeneous groups. The impact of different pricing levels is especially relevant for 
CGE models covering demand-side and income side effects. The small number of CGE 
models included, however, prevents us from determining their quantitative impact. Cover-
ing the impact of single fuels would allow us to conduct a more disaggregated analysis. 
The distributional impact of single fuels is, however, too rarely and inconsistently reported 
to provide robust findings. We further exclude moderator variables on the study design 
for different household equivalence scales, lifetime income measures and inequality meas-
urement units. The reasons for exclusion are: scarce reporting of equivalence scales; het-
erogeneous lifetime income proxies; and too few literature sources comparing different 
inequality measures. The following references explicitly discuss or compare the impact of 
the excluded moderator variables: revenue recycling schemes (Speck 1999; Rausch et al. 
2011; Mathur and Morris 2014; Williams et al. 2015); level of pricing (Dissou and Sid-
diqui 2014; Grottera et  al. 2017); single fuels (Casler and Rafiqui 1993; Jacobsen et  al. 
2003); equivalence scales (Grainger and Kolstad 2010); lifetime income measures (Bull 
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et al. 1994; Hassett et al. 2009) and inequality measurement units (Cornwell and Creedy 
1996; Nikodinoska and Schröder 2016).
Original Study Model Details
Input-Output models cover direct and indirect price changes of different product catego-
ries. The indirect impact accounts for higher prices of goods and services using carbon 
intensive intermediate inputs by applying a static input-output matrix. This approach com-
monly assumes that levies are fully passed through to the final consumers. The assumption 
of inelastic demand corresponds to the short term incidence of price increases (Hassett 
et al. 2009; Feng et al. 2010; Anand et al. 2013). As the income side is neglected, those 
models do not capture long-term impacts but may be useful as an approximation to the true 
effect.
Micro-simulation models account for demand-side changes by considering consumer 
choices. The consumer demand is elastic with consumers maximizing their utility for given 
preferences, prices and budgets. Commonly used micro-simulation models are almost ideal 
demand systems (AIDS) (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; West and Williams 2004; Tiezzi 
2005; Rosas-Flores et al. 2017); its more flexible quadratic specification (QAIDS) (Banks 
et  al. 1997; Brännlund and Nordström 2004; Nikodinoska and Schröder 2016); or more 
recently the exact affine stone index (EASI) demand system (Lewbel and Pendakur 2009; 
Tovar Reaños and Wölfing 2017).
CGE models cover direct and indirect price changes, demand-side changes of consum-
ers and producers, and long-term general equilibrium effects. This approach considers pol-
icy effects on the source side of income in addition to the use side. CGE models assume 
explicit functional forms of demand and supply functions, and use exogenous parameters 
for demand elasticities and elasticities of substitution between production sectors (Hassett 
et al. 2009). Linked models, such as Input-Output and micro-simulations (Creedy and Slee-
man 2006) or CGE models and micro-simulations are further extensions (Labandeira et al. 
2009; Vandyck and Van Regemorter 2014).
Robustness Checks
This part of the appendix gives a comprehensive overview of the sensitivity analyses and 
specification tests conducted in this study. First, we address non-independence of obser-
vations as a common problem in meta-analysis (Ringquist 2013). Non-independence of 
observations generally occurs if at least one country or original study provides multiple 
effects (Ringquist 2013) which also applies to our analysis (see “Appendix  Study Over-
view” and Fig.  2). It potentially causes correlated results within countries or studies. 
Though estimators are not biased or inconsistent they potentially become inefficient (Wal-
dorf and Byun 2005). We account for that problem by imposing cluster-robust standard 
errors by country for the subsequent estimations. Additionally, we conduct one regression 
with cluster-robust standard errors by study to test the impact of the clustering decision.
Second, we conduct several robustness checks on the country modeling. Figure 2 shows 
five or fewer effects for 32 countries. Countries with few observations have a low time 
variation and thus pose the risk of multicollinear time-fixed and time-variant variables. For 
an alternative model specification, we create country groups based on the level of income 
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that replaces the single country dummies. Grouping the countries increases the number 
of effects per dummy variable but assumes similar fixed-effects for all countries within 
the respective income group. For another model specification we exclude all time-variant 
country variables which leaves the respective country dummies to solely account for coun-
try differences. Finally we exclude all dummy variables to investigate the overall influ-
ence of the time-fixed effects. For all three regression types (“Single Country Dummies”, 
“Group Country Dummies” and “No Country Dummies”) we show the results with and 
without the three time-variant country variables (Fig. 3 “Baseline” and “No Country Vari-
ables”). In addition we test different combinations of the three time-variant variables.
Third, we test the validity of the ordered probit model specification. For a valid ordered 
probit specification the regression coefficients of a significantly regressive probit regres-
sion (1=regressive, 0=proportional or progressive) should be similar to the ordered pro-
bit coefficients. The regression coefficients for a significantly progressive probit regression 
(1=progressive, 0=proportional or regressive) should be similar in magnitude but opposite 
in sign (Wehkamp et  al. 2018). We conduct the two probit regressions without country 
dummies because including single country dummies results in infinite iterations.
Fourth, we use a jackknife method to identify the impact of single countries on the 
results (Gould 1995). The descriptive analysis shows unequally distributed effects per 
country (see Fig.  2) which is a common problem in meta-analyses (Ringquist 2013). 
The jackknife method performs N regressions by leaving out the jth observations where 
j = 1, 2,… ,N is the number of each country (N = 39) . The method thus provides N coef-
ficients for each moderator variable. Jackknife regression coefficients that largely deviate 
from the ordered probit coefficient indicate a highly influential country or study.
Finally, we test for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factors and the joint 
significance of the variable groups using the likelihood-ratio test. The variance inflation 
factors for model specifications without single country dummies are rather small ( < 6.08 ), 
indicating no problems with multicollinearity. The context variables are the only group of 
variables that fail the likelihood ratio test (p>0.397). The other variable groups are at least 
significant at the 5% significance level. The pseudo-R2 values range from 0.51 for the main 
regression to 0.13 for the regression without country dummies or variables.
Regression Results Overview
Tables 5 and 6 show the coefficients of the main regression as well as of the robustness 
checks without the single country dummy coefficients. Table 7 shows the results without 
including effects for subsidy reforms.  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 4  Jackknife country coefficients. Notes The figure shows the frequency (y-axis) of binned regression 
coefficients (x-axis) for each moderator variable a–k using the Jackknife method over countries. The distri-
butions thus indicate the sensitivity of the regression coefficients to single countries. The x-axis scales are 
adjusted to the range of coefficient values




Fig. 4  (continued)
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